1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
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4	IN RE: AUTOMOTIVE PARTS Case No. 12-2311
5	ANTITRUST LITIGATION Hon. Marianne O. Battani
6	
7	ALL PARTS
8	
9	/
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11	MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM THE RUSH TRUCKS PLAINTIFFS
12	BEFORE SPECIAL MASTER GENE ESSHAKI
13	Theodore Levin United States Courthouse
14	231 West Lafayette Boulevard Detroit, Michigan
15	Tuesday, November 15, 2016
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25	To obtain a copy of this official transcript, contact: Robert L. Smith, Official Court Reporter (313) 964-3303 • rob_smith@mied.uscourts.gov

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9	
10	(Please note, appearances of attorneys listed are only those that presented argument before the Court.)
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Detroit, Michigan

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      Tuesday, November 15, 2016
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      at about 9:09 a.m.
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               (Special Master and Counsel present.)
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               SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: The first matter we are
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     going to address today is the dispute regarding the order
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     concerning the Rush Truck plaintiffs, and who is going to go
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     first on that?
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               MR. IWREY:
                           I think it was our motion.
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               SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: Okay. Mr. Iwrey.
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               MR. IWREY: Good morning, Special Master.
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     Howard Iwrey, Dykema Gossett, on behalf of the bearing
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     defendants.
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               Hopefully this will be a short under card to
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     today's event, probably around five minutes.
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               This relates to the motion to compel production of
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     documents from the Rush Trucks plaintiffs. As you recall,
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     Your Honor -- or excuse me, Special Master, you ordered
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     production of ten deal files from each of the dealer
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     locations.
                 There are either 48 or 49 of these locations.
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     Defendants' proposed language that said that the documents
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     shall be produced consistent with what has happened in
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     discovery for almost all of the other parties in this action.
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               The Rush plaintiffs' proposed language would
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potentially force defendants to engage in a prohibitively expensive scavenger hunt to obtain only a handful of documents from 49 locations. There is really no justification for this. This isn't a situation where you have thousands and thousands of meaningless expense reports and you invite someone to come into one location and inspect them. These are a handful of documents in 49 locations that the Rush plaintiffs already have to locate pursuant to what you ruled in this case on this motion so they are already going to the expense, and the only thing they are doing, they are forcing us to come here or to come to their location and copy ten files or have the option of doing so. That's not justified, and the only purpose is to frustrate defendants' discovery efforts.

As I mentioned, it is also worth noting that all the defendants produced images of their files. The automobile dealers who you requested produce ten deal files, they too produced images of the ten files, they didn't force us to go to the 50 or so dealership locations.

And, in fact, the Rush plaintiffs, as you know, are being compensated because they have requested incentive payments in their settlement agreements. They specifically said to compensate them for additional document discovery.

Rush doesn't deny our accusation that they are attempting to frustrate discovery but simply says that

Rule 34 allows this as an option. Well, that's true, but it is equally true that Federal Rule 1 says that the rule should be interpreted to facilitate the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action, and Local Rule 1.2 allows the court to suspend the application for good cause, and good cause is shown here, as you know.

Rush doesn't satisfy their discovery obligations that we -- that by requiring us to travel to 49 locations. There is a case that was decided by the bankruptcy court here in Michigan, In re: Dow Corning bankruptcy case,

250 Bankruptcy Reporter 298, made this clear. The court held it would be okay to make documents available perhaps at one location, but it was patently unreasonable to make documents available at separate Department of Defense locations throughout the world, and the Court said that, quote, this was designed to frustrate the discovery process, and that's exactly what Rush is proposing here.

Rush's cases don't really shed any light on this because those cases said that you had the option to produce documents and in those cases there were only -- there was only one location, at counsel's office, they didn't talk about 49 separate locations.

So, Mr. Special Master, defendants would propose our version of the proposed order obligating Rush to produce these 490 files -- 490 deal jackets or at most make them

available at one location. Rush's language I would submit would pave the way for some very unfavorable precedent particularly for plaintiffs including Rush as defendants' documents are located throughout the world.

The second issue is -- relates to your order that the Rush plaintiffs do not have to produce pre-acquisition deal documents if they disclaim their damages. They have -- Your Honor said at the last hearing they don't have to produce these documents if they, quote, disclaim any and all damages or recovery in this matter or any matter included or to be included within 12-md-2311.

SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: Mr. Iwrey, can you refresh my recollection, was that based upon a stipulation received from Rush?

MR. IWREY: Right, under the propose language they said we propose that they don't have to produce those acquisition documents if they stipulate to disclaim those damages. Our dispute here is what are they proposing to disclaim. Rush wants to carve out from this this disclaimer recovery as members of any class or including in connection with settlements. That's almost really 100 percent consistent — inconsistent with your ruling because it would allow them to avoid discovery but still make claims for pre-acquisition sales as class members.

The ruling didn't really differentiate between

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claims made as class members and claims made on an individual basis, and there is really no meaningful distinction between those two types of claims. Whether you are pursuing it on an individual basis or a class member you are still pursuing claims for recovery relating to the same pre-acquisition sales, and whether the money is ultimately doled out by a jury or by an administrator is not a meaningful distinction. Rush says that it is not relevant to adequacy. think that's a straw-man argument because you already found that these documents are relevant if they don't disclaim their damages claims for pre-acquisition sales. I would also arque that a plaintiff who only made purchases of a few products during the class period would really not have the same incentive to pursue claims of other -- on behalf of other members in the class and therefore would fail to satisfy the adequacy and typicality elements of Rule 23. If Rush wants to avoid production of these documents they must either -- they must disclaim pre -claims for pre-acquisition sales of all types, whether it is on an individual basis or a class basis. And the final difference between our proposed orders relates to whether they can have 45 or 60 days. SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: Let's not worry about that, sir.

Yes.

MR. IWREY:

SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: Thank you, Mr. Iwrey. 1 2 MR. IWREY: Thank you. 3 SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: Counsel, please identify yourself for the record. 4 5 MR. SPERL: Good morning, Special Master. 6 is Andrew Sperl with Duane Morris for truck and equipment 7 dealer plaintiffs. 8 First of all, I will deny and I do deny that the 9 truck and equipment dealer plaintiffs are trying to stonewall 10 discovery. There doesn't seem to be any dispute that Rule 34 11 does permit either the inspection of documents or the 12 production of documents where appropriate. Defendants' 13 concerns, I would submit, at this point really are premature, 14 we are not necessarily talking about going to 49 different 15 locations across the United States of America because we are 16 still in the process of locating the files that defendants 17 have previously identified, and there are a number of other 18 files that defendants have not yet identified that they have 19 the right to identify pursuant to the order. 20 Until we finish locating that we don't know which 21 files we would be producing versus which files we would 22 suggest be made available for inspection. All we ask at this 23 point is that the order leave open the option of making the 24 files available for inspection if, in fact, it is reasonable 25 Of course, we will be subject to the same rules of

reasonableness that applies to anyone in discovery.

For instance, the investigation that we have done so far reveals that a lot of the files have been sent to offsite storage and that those files are probably located in nine or ten Iron Mountain locations across the United States. Depending upon where those are located, how many locations, how many files and how they are organized, it might be more reasonable for defendants to go to some of those locations rather than having the boxes all shipped from there to our central legal department, gone through and shipped back, but that's not really the issue before you right now.

The issue that is before you is just whether or not the order that is entered leaves open the possibilities that indisputably are permitted under Rule 34. If defendants determine after we make a proposal about what is to be produced and what is to be made available for inspection, if that's not reasonable that would be the time to take that up.

Secondly, regarding the disclaimer of --

SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: Please forgive me,

Counsel. Just give me a minute. I was just going to do this
thinking a call was going to come in and sure enough. Try
and enter your 13-digit password with this type of pressure.

MR. SPERL: I understand.

SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: Please continue.

MR. SPERL: I was just beginning my second point

which is on the scope of the disclaimer. Our understanding of your ruling previously was that the reason for the named plaintiffs to disclaim damages from dealerships if they are not going to produce the acquisition documents for those dealerships, and by the acquisition I mean Rush acquiring the dealerships, not acquisition of individual units, is simply because it would be unfair for defendants to have to defend against the claim where they can determine through discovery if we acquired a right to that claim, but that issue is not implicated under the language we proposed because that deals strictly with whether or not the named plaintiffs have the right to basically submit claim forms in the same way as every other member of the recovery class would be submitting the claim forms.

Defendants have no legitimate interest in this because it doesn't affect the amount the defendants would pay either by settlement or by recovery after finding of liability. I don't believe any of the other members of the class will have to submit the type of documentation acquisition forms or acquisition documents that the Rush plaintiffs are being asked to submit. This is strictly a matter of allocation of proceeds in whatever claims administration process is entered, and that's not to say that they eventually would recover for these dealerships in the claims administration process, only that they should be able

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to submit claims in the same way without having to produce
additional documentation that other members of the class
don't need to, and I will stand on the cases that we cited
for why this is irrelevant for questions of adequacy and
typicality.
         Finally, really briefly on the number of days --
         SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: Don't worry about that,
Counsel.
         MR. SPERL:
                     Okay.
         SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: Thank you. I have had
sufficient argument. Mr. Iwrey, no need for rebuttal.
                     Thank you, Special Master.
         MR. SPERL:
         SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: Thank you very much,
Mr. Sperl.
         I have read all the materials and I understand the
issue in this case, and it is my ruling that the documents
shall be produced to the defendants and not to be made
available wherever they may be located, they shall be
produced to the defendants.
         Secondly, we will have 60 days.
         And third, the Rush Truck plaintiffs must disclaim
any pre-acquisition sales for any acquisitions that they
made, and as I envision this the question will become how
many vehicles did you purchase and/or sell during the
relevant conspiracy period. That answer will only include
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vehicles sold by dealerships that were acquired by Rush, the
sales occurred after the acquisition, so Rush is not entitled
to claim pre-acquisition sales. So I believe the order as
Mr. Iwrey has drafted it, changing the 45 days to 60 days, is
in keeping with what I just said. Would you agree,
Mr. Iwrey?
         MR. IWREY:
                     Yes, Special Master.
         SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: Now let me ask you, do you
have the magic language? Yes, you do. If you would revise
that, get it to me, we will have it entered.
         MR. IWREY:
                     Thank you.
         SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: All right. Mr. Sperl,
thank you very much.
         MR. SPERL:
                     Thank You, Special Master.
         SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: Thank you, Counsel, both
of you.
         I wanted to talk generally about what's going to be
                  I've got some concerns I want to share with
occurring today.
you, I've got some observations I want to share with you, and
obviously I'm going to get and entertain from you your
thoughts and your suggestions.
         This is, in fact, a mediation. We are going to be
conducting a mediation, and anything that is said during the
course of our discussions will be considered confidential,
and I don't want it seeing -- I don't want to see any of
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those discussions appear in any subsequently filed motions or briefs or whatever, so please keep that in mind. Put a big note on your yellow pads, confidential, privileged discussions.

Secondly, obviously weaving its way through the motion is the question of cost sharing, and we will discuss that today, and it will be the subject of the hearing that we have set for December 9th. So it will be briefed, in the answer it has been briefed, I think touched upon in the motion, it can be briefed in the reply.

Next, I want you to know that the auto-dealer plaintiffs' motion for -- to compel request 31 will be set for hearing on the 31st -- no, on the 9th, so the defendants should be prepared to address -- strike that, the OEMs should be prepared to address that motion as well so that it will be teed up for hearing on the 9th of December.

I want to tell you my general reactions, this is not a ruling, my general reactions as to how I think this process should evolve. I believe it was General Motors and maybe even Toyota that have suggested that what should occur is that the parties agree upon exemplars of documents that they want, that the OEM will produce the exemplars. That the parties can then request samples of the data be filled in on the exemplars for a limited number of vehicles, and that in so doing the OEMs will be able to determine how much of the

data they have, how reasonably accessible that data is, what the cost of producing the data will be, how long it will take.

And then once that information is known the parties can then decide what additional vehicles they would like to request data upon knowing that the cost is going to be X multiplied by the number of additional vehicles that they want. And in so doing that may, in fact, act as a tamper on an unreasonable list of vehicles or unreasonable amount of documents because we know that the cost is going to be \$500,000, and if there is going to be cost sharing that will go into the decision-making of the serving parties on what they ask for.

So those are just my concerns today. It is my hope we can work something out. My biggest concern is that I am estimating that we probably have five percent of the documents from the OEMs that have been produced to date, and we have a March class cert order and an April class cert order or deadlines in the wire harness, bearings and anti-vibrational parts. As I sit here and just think about the process that I have outlined for you about exemplars, samples, final requests, I don't see how that can occur because as a betting man I would bet a dollar to a doughnut that my opinion on December 9th will be appealed to the Judge, and that, because of the holidays, I do not believe

Judge Battani will be able to get to those appeals until probably January 15th or so.

She will then take a couple weeks to issue an order, so we are looking at the end of January before we decide what documents are going to have to be produced and how they are going to be produced, and as I said, we have a March cert order that I don't think you are going to be able to make, so I'm very worried about the deadlines that are currently established and the documents that have yet to be produced and how long it is going to take to produce them because I'm concerned we are not going to meet that deadline.

So I indicated that I would -- I would speak with anybody that wanted to speak with me in private before we started our discussions, and I hate to do this to you but I think what I'm going to do based upon my readings of yesterday, which included all of the answers filed by the -- they are not really answers, they are short opposition statements, filed by the OEMs, I didn't have this until yesterday, I believe I might be more fruitful in starting with Toyota. So that's what I'm going to do but, please, can somebody give me an indication of who would like to meet with me before we start for a brief 10-, 15-minute conference? All right. Why don't you please stand up, come to the podium, tell me who you are and who you represent.

MR. WALTERS: Good morning, Your Honor.

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     Neil Walters from Ballard Spar for Subaru of America.
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                         Good morning, Your Honor. Colin --
              MR. KASS:
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              SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: Good morning, Mr. Kass.
              MR. KASS: Colin Kass for Proskauer representing
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 5
     Chrysler FCA.
 6
                                        Thank you, sir.
              SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI:
 7
              MS. METZGAR: Good morning. Kim Metzgar from
 8
     Ice Miller for Subaru of Indiana Automotive.
 9
              SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: Thank you.
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              MR. HEMLOCK: Good morning, Your Honor.
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     Adam Hemlock, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, on behalf of
12
     defendants.
13
              I would suggest that I meet with you along with
14
     Mr. Cherry, who represents Denso, but I think he wants to
15
     meet with you, sir.
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              SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: You have --
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              MR. HEMLOCK: We have Bridgestone and Calsonic, but
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     it would be on behalf of the defendants generally.
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              SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: Okay.
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              MR. CHERRY: Right. I'm Steve Cherry from
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     Wilmer Hale on behalf of the Denso defendants. My colleague,
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     Pat Carome, is here with me.
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              We filed a separate motion, but I believe we could
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     probably meet with you along with Mr. Hemlock.
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              SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: Okay. Very good.
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Everybody is obviously familiar with the Denso motion, which is simply to defer ruling on the document requests, at least as to Denso, for the time being because I believe they have resolved their wire harness cases and they don't have a dog in the anti-vibrational cases.

Please come up, sir.

MR. CHERRY: Yes. So in wire harnesses for -- so, first of all, we have resolved all of our indirect purchaser cases so we have no interest in any downstream discovery from the OEMs. As far as upstream discovery, in wire harnesses it remains to be seen whether we will need that or not. We filed a summary judgment motion yesterday, which we are very hopeful will be granted in which case we won't need any discovery on wire harnesses for body ECUs but that there will be no discovery needed for the wire harness case at all, and so for that reason we have asked that that just be set aside for right now.

SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: Now, what about anti-vibrational parts and bearings, are you not in that case?

MR. CHERRY: We are not in either of those cases, and I believe the parties will tell you they need that discovery, but we are in 13 other direct purchaser cases that don't have -- that aren't in -- as far along in discovery yet, and what our motion proposes is what we are concerned

about is that some of those cases we may find ourselves in the same situation as we are in wire harnesses where there is a way we believe for the case to be decided without even getting to class cert without the discovery that we are talking about, and -- but that's all upstream. And so the downstream discovery, as I think Mr. Williams will tell you, that applies to all cases so it needs to be done.

For upstream, we think that's more of a case-by-case basis and while we may talk about sort of a general understanding of what might be needed, we would certainly ask that any production be stayed so that the parties don't incur the burdens and the costs of that when it may not be needed, and that there be some flexibility, some understanding that when we get to that case it may be possible to rein things in a little bit, we may learn we don't need all that we were initially granted but we may also find there is some targeted request for a particular case and particularly a dispute with the direct purchasers that we need a particular file about certain RFQs, that sort of thing.

So I think we just -- what we are urging is there be some staging for the efficiencies and the scheduling of these cases and where they are in the process, and that while we may discuss and agree upon sort of a template in terms of what is to be produced we recognize that as we get to a case

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there may be some need for some flexibility there.
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              SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: Now, a lot of -- I believe
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     a lot of the parties may disagree with you on staying this
     matter right now, but what about the thought that I stay it,
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     as you request, just as to Denso and Furukawa and let it
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     continue, you will not share in the information that is
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     produced unless and until you change your mind and say we
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     need it, in which event you have to pay for your
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     proportionate share of the cost shifting that has been
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     imposed.
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              MR. CHERRY:
                           And, Your Honor, your suggestion goes
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     to all cases or to the wire harness case?
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              SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: Well, my initial reaction
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     would be -- you call it the wire harness case, I call it the
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     first three, okay, yes, the first three.
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              MR. CHERRY: Well, for the first three --
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              SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: Because you don't have a
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     dog in two and three, it is just wire harness.
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              MR. CHERRY: Well, in the wire harness case the
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     only parties in that case right now are the direct purchasers
21
     and Denso, Furukawa and MELCO, Mitsubishi Electric.
                                                           The
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     direct purchasers are not a party to the subpoena.
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     Mitsubishi Electric was not a party to the motion to compel,
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     and Denso and Furukawa are both asking that we hold off on
     this until there is rulings on summary judgment. So there is
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nobody seeking that discovery -- well, let me say the only
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     parties seeking discovery are in agreement that it should be
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     held in abeyance until there is a ruling on summary judgment.
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               SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: Okay. Does anyone have
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     opposition to that, please?
 6
               (No response.)
 7
               SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: All right. Very good.
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               MR. CHERRY: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               SPECIAL MASTER ESSHAKI: All right. Let's just go
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     in order. Mr. Walters.
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               Robert, we are all set for now.
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               (Off-the-record mediation was held at 9:37 a.m.)
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1 CERTIFICATION 2 3 I, Robert L. Smith, Official Court Reporter of the United States District Court, Eastern District of 4 5 Michigan, appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, 6 United States Code, Section 753, do hereby certify that the 7 foregoing pages comprise a full, true and correct transcript 8 taken in the matter of Case No. 12-02311, on Tuesday, 9 November 15, 2016. 10 11 12 s/Robert L. Smith Robert L. Smith, RPR, CSR 5098 13 Federal Official Court Reporter United States District Court 14 Eastern District of Michigan 15 16 17 Date: 12/06/2016 18 Detroit, Michigan 19 20 21 22 23 24 25